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The Story of Cra»ford
Richard D. Friedman
I never open most of the unsolicited e-mail messages I get. But the
subject line of one I received on the afternoon of March 10, 2003"Confrontation Clause cert petition"-caught my eye. For some years I
had been contending that the Supreme Court should dramatically
change its conception of what the Sixth Amendment means when it
guarantees an accused "the right to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." And so I opened the message immediately, and read:
Professor FriedmanI graduated from Michigan Law School in 1997. Although I never
had you as a professor, I became familiar with your Confrontation
Clause scholarship in 1999, when I was clerking for Justice Stevens
during the Lilly v. Virginia1 case.
I now practice law in Seattle and teach as an adjunct professor at
the Univ of Washington School of Law. As part of my practice, I
occasionally handle cases presenting constitutional criminal procedure issues for the NACDL (National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). After I learned of the Washington Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in this case, I contacted
the defendant's attorney, and he gave the case to me.
I thought you might be interested in the cert petition that I filed in
the case last Friday, so I've attached a copy. As you can see, I am
urging the Court to adopt the testimonial approach you presented in
Lilly in order to put an end to lower court opinions like this one. If
you have any thoughts on this case or the issue in general, I would,
of course, love to hear them. Otherwise, I will be sure to let you
know if the Court takes the case. We hope to get an answer before
the end of this Term.
Sincerely,
Jeff Fisher
t

527 U.S. 116 (1999).
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Now, of course, I was intrigued, and so I opened the attachment and
read the petition. Michael Crawford had been charged with assault. At
his trial, the prosecution offered a statement made in the police station
on the night of the incident by Crawford's wife Sylvia, who did not
testify at trial. He objected, in part on the ground that this violated his
right under the Confrontation Clause. The trial court nevertheless
admitted the statement, and Crawford was convicted. The Washington
Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the judgment. In rejecting the Confrontation Clause challenge, that court purported to apply the thengoverning doctrine of Ohio v. Roberts,2 under which the Clause posed no
obstacle to admissibility if the statement was deemed sufficiently reliable. And the court concluded that the statement met this standard, in
part because it "interlocked" with a statement Michael himself had
made to the police the same night. In his petition, Jeff-as I will refer to
Fisher, because we have become friends and close working colleaguesargued first that the "interlock" theory was in conflict with decisions of
other jurisdictions and was an inappropriate application of Roberts. This
part of the petition struck me as very, very good-well argued, precise,
and professional. But it was the second part of the petition to which Jeff
had referred in his message. There, he urged that the Court take the
case so that it could throw out the whole Roberts doctrine. The Court
should replace that doctrine, he said, by an approach under which an
out-of-court statement that is testimonial in nature cannot be introduced
against an accused if he has not had a chance to cross-examine the
maker of the statement. As Jeff had indicated in his e-mail, this was the
approach I had advocated in my scholarship, and the petition featured
generous quotations from my work. Now, as you can imagine, I thought
this was a great petition.
Indeed, I began salivating, at least figuratively. In response to
amicus briefs in two prior cases, one of which was the Lilly case
mentioned by Jeff, three justices had indicated their willingness to
rethink the foundations of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. But
amici, friends of the Court, stand on the sidelines. Until a party to a case
before the Court urged the Court to discard Roberts, we were probably
going to be stuck with it for the foreseeable future. And here was a
defendant, represented by an able lawyer, who was asking for just the
change I had hoped, adoption of the testimonial approach. But three
questions were immediately apparent:
• Would the Court take the case? Most petitions for certiorari are
rejected.
• If the Court took the case, would it reach the broad issue, or would
it simply continue to apply the Roberts framework? The Court
2

448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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usually tries to avoid broad questions if it can decide a case on
narrow grounds, and there was no doubt the Court could reverse
Michael Crawford's conviction without needing to consider whether
it should abandon Roberts.
• If the Court did reach the broad issue, would it actually adopt the
testimonial approach, or would it stick with Roberts? The Court is
generally hesitant to make dramatic changes in doctrine, and there
was no doubt that rejecting Roberts would be dramatic. And, as in
Crawford's case, the Court always could reach a sensible result
while staying within the Roberts framework (The Court could reach
just about any result within that framework, and that was part of
the problem.)
All three questions would be answered in the affirmative over the
next year. And so the story of Crawford is much more than the story of
Mike and Sylvia Crawford and the knife fight with another man that
landed Mike in prison. It is also the story of how the accused's right to
be confronted with witnesses developed over the centuries and then
atrophied, and of how a young lawyer with talent, gumption, and guts
was able to persuade the Supreme Court to restore the right to its proper
place at the center of our system of criminal justice. From my point of
view as a scholar, it is a story that is enjoyable to tell in part because it is
so gratifying.

* **
Let's do a little thought experiment. It is 1220, and the young King
Henry III has given you a hard assignment. Until recently, the criminal
justice system in England, like that of most Christian countries, has
relied to a considerable extent on various means to determine the
judgment of God. Principal among these were the ordeals. For example,
an accused person might be asked to carry a red-hot iron rod a fixed
distance in his hand. If in three days his wound was healing nicely, then
this was taken as judgment that he was innocent; if it was festering, he
was deemed guilty. Alternatively, the accused might be bound up and
lowered into cold water. If he sank, he was deemed innocent and pulled
out, wet but happy; if he floated, that was taken as a sign of guilt.
This wasn't a bad system, if your principal concern was reaching a
judgment that was swift and easy to determine. The problem, of course,
was that to accept these ordeals one would have to have a lot of faith
that God was in fact revealing judgment in these strange ways. In 1215,
at the great Fourth Lateran Council, the Catholic Church forbade its
clergy to participate in administering the ordeals. This limitation has
impaired the practice, which had already lost much support in England.
So your job is to devise a new system that does not rely on the ordeals.
What will you do?
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You probably will realize pretty quickly that a rational system of
adjudication must depend to a large extent on witnesses, who have
information relevant to the case to transmit to the adjudicator. But how
will they pass that information on-that is, how will they testify?
Probably requiring them to take an oath is a good idea, so that they
know the seriousness of the matter and they understand they are at risk
of damnation3 if they testify falsely. Beyond that, various means are
possible. You could follow the method used by the later Athenians, and
have all the witnesses submit written testimony in a pot, which would be
sealed up until the day of trial and then presented to the adjudicator. Or
you could go along with a model being developed by most of the courts in
Continental Europe, in which testimony is received and recorded in
writing by an official out of the presence of the parties-for fear that
otherwise the witnesses will be intimidated-but with the parties afforded an opportunity to pose questions in writing.
But you may be drawn to another model, the system used by the
ancient Hebrews, by the earlier Athenians, and by the Romans: Witnesses give their testimony orally, in the presence of the parties, at an
open trial. This system avoids any possibility that the witness's testimony has been transmitted incorrectly to the court. It gives the accused
some assurance that the witnesses against him are not testifying as a
result of coercion. It also may give the accused a chance to question the
witness. And it puts a significant moral onus on the witness, telling her
in effect: "If you're going to say that, look him in the eye."
Now of course this thought experiment does not reflect reality, in
that nobody sat down and designed the common law system of criminal
adjudication; rather, it evolved over centuries. But it is clear that by the
middle of the sixteenth century the English courts were following the
last of these models, the one requiring open, confrontational testimony,
in which a witness gave testimony face to face with the accused. Indeed,
repeatedly over the next few centuries, English commentators on the law
proclaimed this method of giving testimony as the central glory of their
criminal justice system. Repeatedly, too, Parliament passed statutes
providing that in treason cases witnesses had to testify "face to face"
with the accused.
This procedure was not uniformly followed. In some politically
charged cases in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, particularly treason cases, the Crown presented evidence that had been taken out
of the presence of the petitioner. The case of Sir Walter Raleigh was the
most notorious of these, but not the only one. Statutes passed under
Queen Mary in the middle of the sixteenth century required justices of
3 Under the softer conception of later times, the risk would only be of a perjury
prosecution.
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the peace to take statements from witnesses to felonies, and soon it
became established that a statement so taken could be admitted at trial
if it had been taken under oath and the witness was unavailable to
testify then. Finally, a set of courts, such as the Court of the Star
Chamber, followed the Continental style of taking testimony rather than
the English style.
By the middle to end of the seventeenth century, however, the right
to be confronted with adverse witnesses was firmly established. Courts
in treason cases not only ensured that the prosecution witnesses testified
live at trial but solicitously gave the accused the opportunity to crossexamine. The practice permitted under the Marian statutes was not
expanded beyond the scope of those statutes, felony cases; in misdemeanor cases, the notable case of R v. Payne ruled in 1696 that, even if a
witness were unavailable at trial, his prior testimony could not be
introduced against the accused if the defendant had not had an opportunity for cross-examination. And most of the courts following the Continental model, including the Star Chamber, did not survive the political
upheavals of the era. Equity courts continued to take evidence in the
Continental style, but they did not have criminal jurisdiction. If a
witness was unavailable at trial in a common law court, depositions
taken in equity could be admitted, but only if the adverse party had had
an adequate opportunity to pose questions in writing.
The confrontation right crossed the Atlantic, and it took strong root
in America. In England, until the nineteenth century, most criminal
cases were privately prosecuted, and the accused usually was not represented by counsel. But in America, the right to counsel became established sooner, and this intensified the benefit of the confrontation right,
because it made the ability to cross-examine witnesses more valuable.
Moreover, cases prosecuted by the Crown under the Stamp Acts were
assigned to the admiralty courts, which followed the Continental model,
operating without a jury and taking testimony in writing out of the
presence of the parties. 4 This practice became one of the colonists'
grievances leading to the Revolution. 5 Most of the early state constitu4

This history is summarized in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47-56.

5

The Stamp Act Congress complained that "by extending the jurisdiction of the courts
of Admiralty beyond its ancient limits," the Act had "a manifest tendency to subvert the
rights and liberties of the colonists," one of which was trial by jury. Resolutions of the
Stamp Act Congress § 8th (Oct. 19, 1765), reprinted in SouRCES OF OuR LIBERTIES 270, 271
(R. Perry & J. Cooper eds. 1959). The Declaration of Independence made a similar
complaint, asserting in its enumeration of grievances against King George III:
He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution
and unacknowledged by our laws, giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation: * * *
For depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury ....
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tions included a guarantee that prosecution witnesses would testify live
in the presence of the accused. Some used the time-honored "face to
face" formula. Others used language very similar to that which was
incorporated into the federal Constitution after its ratification, when the
absence of an enumeration of rights was corrected by the first ten
amendments, the Bill of Rights. The sixth amendment, ratified in 1791,
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
Note that in this account, the term hearsay has not played a rolejust as it is not mentioned in the Confrontation Clause itself. Indeed, the
rule against hearsay as we know it today was still inchoate at the time
the Clause was adopted. The Clause was not a constitutional statement
of the rule against hearsay, but rather a procedural rule about how
prosecution testimony should be given.
Soon, though, the distinction became less apparent. Around the time
of the adoption of the sixth amendment, and for several decades thereafter, the hearsay rule developed rapidly. The increasing role of criminal
defense counsel seems to have been largely responsible for the change.
Defense lawyers recognized the potential value of cross-examination
whenever the probative value of adverse evidence depended in part on
the capacities of an observer to perceive, remember, and describe an
event or condition and on her inclination to communicate accurately. By
the early years of the nineteenth century, then, something like the
modern definition of hearsay-an out-of-court statement offered to prove
the truth of a matter that it asserted-had emerged. And indeed, in
1838, the rule against hearsay reached its high-water mark, when the
House of Lords held in effect, in the famous case of Wright v. Doe d.
Tatham,6 that the rule applied not only to statements but to any out-ofcourt conduct offered to prove the truth of a proposition apparently
And what were "the benefits of trial by jury"? In its Address to the Inhabitants of the
Province of Quebec, of October 26, 1774 (drafted, like the Stamp Act resolutions, by John
Dickinson), the First Continental Congress explained that this right
provides that neither life, liberty, nor property can be taken from the possessor until
twelve of his unexceptionable countrymen and peers of his vicinage, who, from that
neighborhood, may reasonably be supposed to be acquainted with his character and the
characters of the witnesses, upon a fair trial and full inquiry, face to face, in open
court, before as many of the people as choose to attend, shall pass their sentence upon
oath against him ....
http://www.ushistory .org/declaration/related/decres.htm
Thus, though neither the Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress nor the Declaration
of Independence explicitly mentions the confrontation right, it appears that the right is
included in their references to trial by jury-the English style of adjudication, in contrast
with the Continental style used by the admiralty courts. The Sixth Amendment articulates
the two rights separately, side by side.
6

5 Cl. & F. 670, 7 E.R. 559, 47 Rev. Rep. 136 (H.L. 1838).
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believed by the actor. Even without this extension, the rule described a
vast category of evidence, including but reaching far beyond the relatively narrow category of testimonial statements that was the focus of the
confrontation right. But the rule against hearsay was never absolute,
and for nearly two centuries courts and rule-makers have developed an
ever-expanding list of exceptions to it. These are designed to exempt
from the rule hearsay that will be particularly helpful to the truthdetermination process, because it appears highly probable that the
statement in question is accurate and because there is no good substitute
evidence for the statement.
With so much intellectual energy focused on the rule against hearsay, the independent role of the confrontation right-as a categorical
prohibition of testimonial evidence offered against the accused without
offering him an opportunity to be face-to-face with the witness and crossexamine her-became obscured. I believe many decision-makers still had
a rough intuitive sense of where the right applied, and this sense almost
unconsciously helped shape the rule against hearsay and helped prevent
results from being altogether intolerable. 7 And so we muddled through.
Any result a court should have reached by speaking of the accused's
right to confront witnesses it could still reach by speaking of the rule
against hearsay-until 1965. In that year, the Supreme Court held that
the confrontation right is a fundamental one that is applicable against
the states via the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. 8 Now a
federal court, whether on direct or collateral review, could hold that a
state court conviction was invalid because it had violated the accused's
confrontation right-but not because it violated the state's rule against
hearsay. Therefore, it became crucial to understand the scope of the
confrontation right.
The problem was that, with the confrontation right having been
mixed together with the rule against hearsay for so long, the Supreme
Court did not have a well developed and articulated understanding of
what the right meant and where it applied. And so before long the Court
started referring for guidance to the rule against hearsay-which meant
that the confrontation right had very little force of its own. In Ohio u.
Roberts, the Court tried to articulate a general framework, under which
7 For example, many (but not all) American jurisdictions in the late twentieth century
would not allow a confession made to the authorities by one confederate to be introduced
against another confederate. The reason usually given was that such a statement was
unreliable, because it may have been made to curry favor with the authorities. Sometimes
these statements are indeed highly unreliable-but sometimes not. The real reason to
exclude such statements is that they amount to testimony against the second confederate;
this, I believe, accounts for the simple, categorical rule against such statements that was
adopted by the twelve judges in Tang's Case, Kel. J. 17, 84 Eng. Rep. 1061 (1662).
8

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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any hearsay statement-not just testimonial statements-made by an

out-of-court declarant posed a potential Confrontation Clause problem.
On the one hand, the Court seemed to set up a general requirement that
such hearsay could not be admitted if the declarant was available to be a
witness at trial. On the other hand, the confrontation problem could be
overcome by showing that the statement was reliable, and reliability
could be demonstrated by showing that the statement fell "within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception." Alternatively, the Court suggested, the
reliability test could be satisfied by "a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. " 9
This framework was shaky from the start. The Court quickly drew
back from the supposed unavailability requirement-which if taken
seriously would have meant, for example, that a routine business record
could not be introduced without showing that its makers were unavailable to testify at trial. 10 The Court continued to profess adherence to the
reliability requirement, but it was highly problematic. Why should the
fact that an exception from the ordinary (that is, non-constitutional) rule
against hearsay had become "firmly rooted" (whatever that meant)
relieve a statement fitting within the exception (as construed by the
Supreme Court 11 ) from the constitutional guarantee of confrontation?
And what if a state interpreted a given exception in a way that was
particularly generous to the prosecution? Moreover, the "individualized
guarantees of trustworthiness" prong of the doctrine was highly manipulable. Regardless of whether a statement was made calmly or in
excitement, soon after the events it described or after a period for
reflection, to private persons or to police officers, lower courts tended to
conclude that the statement was made in circumstances giving it sufficient reliability to warrant admission.
I became particularly interested in the confrontation right around
1990. I was working on a large project on the law of hearsay, and I
became convinced that the confrontation right was the key to unlocking
9

448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).

10 See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) (holding that a conspirator's
statement may be admitted against an accused even if the declarant is available to testify
at trial but does not do so); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (holding that spontaneous
declarations are admissible against an accused notwithstanding availability of declarant).
11 Monitoring by the Court was necessary, because otherwise a state court could
interpret a particular exception with undue generosity towards the state. In both Lee v.
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), and Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), the state courts
had admitted confessions made by co-defendants to police officers, and in each case the
Court refused to accept for Confrontation Clause purposes the state's characterization of
the statement as a declaration against penal interest. In Lilly, a plurality explicitly stated
that "accomplice's statements that shift or spread the blame to a criminal defendant" fall
outside a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception.
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the hearsay puzzle. Because the confrontation right had become dependent on the law of hearsay, the rule against hearsay was more restrictive
than it should be in general, and the confrontation right was less strong
than it should be. It became apparent to me that, Roberts notwithstanding, it was not true that any hearsay statement posed a potential
confrontation problem; rather, it was only those statements made with
the anticipation that they would aid in the investigation or prosecution
of crime. And Roberts erred by holding that even this type of statement
did not violate the confrontation right if it was deemed sufficiently
reliable; there should be a categorical rule of exclusion. But I lacked a
theory under which this one type of statement should be considered the
focus of the Confrontation Clause. During two extended periods in
Oxford in the 1990s, though, I found myself drawn, against my original
inclination, back into the remote history I have just summarized. I had
the great fortune of being able to work with Mike Macnair, an extraordinarily knowledgeable English historian who understood the materials far
better than I did. And the picture clicked into place: The Confrontation
Clause does not simply describe a species of statement that is subject to
a stringent rule of evidentiary exclusion. Rather, it is a fundamental
procedural rule designed to ensure that testimony is given under proper
conditions, in the presence of the accused. Statements that perform the
function of testimony, by providing information for use in investigation
or prosecution of crime, are necessarily within the ambit of the Clause,
and as to these the Clause provides a categorical rule of exclusion-for
otherwise, our system would countenance a method of giving testimony
against an accused that did not require confrontation.
I was not the only scholar, nor the first (though I may have been the
most persistent and obsessive), to argue that Roberts erred by diluting
the confrontation right-on the one hand by giving it the breadth of
hearsay law rather than grappling with the meaning of the phrase
"witnesses against", and on the other by allowing the right to be
defeated upon a finding that the statement was reliable. Michael Graham, Akhil Amar, and Margaret Burger all articulated theories that
resembled mine to some extent, though in each case there were significant differences as well. Moreover, the United States Government played
a significant role. In United States v. lnadi, in a brief co-authored by a
young Assistant Solicitor General, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., the Government
argued that the Confrontation Clause, having been intended to prohibit
trial by affidavit and comparable practices, "closely regulated the admission of hearsay, such as former testimony, that is broadly analogous to
an affidavit or deposition, " 12 but did not seriously limit the admission of
other hearsay. The Court ruled in favor of the Government-holding
that a statement fitting within the hearsay exemption for declarations of
12

Brief for the United States 25, United States v. Inadi, No. 84-1580.
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a conspirator could be admitted against an accused even absent a
showing that the declarant was unavailable-without reaching the essence of the Government's argument. In 1992, in White v. Illinois, the
Solicitor General's office tried again, submitting an amicus brief that
argued that the Confrontation Clause should apply only to "those
individuals who actually provide in-court testimony or the functional
equivalent-i.e., affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or other statements (such as confessions) that are made with a view to legal proceedings."13 The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
said this argument came "too late in the day"; "[s]uch a narrow reading
of the Confrontation Clause," the Court said, "would virtually eliminate
its role in restricting the admission of hearsay testimony," and it was
barred by the Court's precedents.14 But Justice Clarence Thomas, joined
by Justice Antonin Scalia, wrote a concurring opinion, saying the Court
had rejected the Solicitor General's approach too hastily. While not
endorsing that approach in its entirety, Thomas suggested that "the
Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only
insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." 15 (But why, one
might ask, is a confession necessarily "formalized"?)
In May 1998, in part by virtue of another stroke of luck, I was
seated next to Justice Stephen Breyer at a dinner in Oxford. He spoke
favorably about the value of amicus briefs from academics. I thought of
that conversation several months later when the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Lilly v. Virginia, a case in which the state courts had held
the Confrontation Clause did not preclude admitting a statement made
to the police accusing the declarant's brother of being the trigger man in
a murder. Margaret Burger and I co-authored an amicus brief for the
American Civil Liberties Union, urging the Court to discard Roberts and
adopt a doctrine under which the Confrontation Clause applied categorically to out-of-court statements by those deemed to be witnesses against
the accused (however that term might be understood). By a 5-4 vote, the
Court held that the challenged statement should not have been admitted
against Lilly. (The minority agreed that the conviction should be reversed, but would have left it to the Virginia courts to decide whether
there were particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.) What I found
most exciting was that Justice Breyer, a member of the majority, wrote a
concurrence saying quite explicitly that he found the arguments in our
13 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (No. 90-6113), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records
and Briefs 1991/92 FO, Card 4 of 7 (CIS).
H

502 U.S. at 352-53.

15

502 U.S. at 365.
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brief appealing. There was no need to re-examine the link between
hearsay law and the Confrontation Clause in that case, he concluded, but
the question was "open for another day."
And so that made three justices who had expressed willingness to
consider a revamp of Confrontation Clause doctrine. But, especially
given that Roberts was so manipulable that it almost always would allow
the Court to reach whatever result it wanted, a change was unlikely to
occur at the urging of amici. Transformation would not occur unless a
defendant made a point of asking for it.

***
Michael and Sylvia Crawford, both 21, were married and had a small
child. But life was hardly idyllic. They had recently re-united after a
period of separation, and neither of them was employed. They spent the
afternoon of Thursday, August 5, 1999 as they spent much of their time,
drinking with friends in downtown Olympia, Washington. At some point,
they decided that they needed to settle an old score with an acquaintance
whom they knew as Kenny Lee. And so the two set off to find him. They
may have searched first at several taverns that Kenny frequented, but in
any event they soon wound up at Kenny's apartment; Sylvia, who had
been there before, showed Mike the way.
When they saw Kenny, Mike immediately mentioned several hundred dollars-drug money, perhaps? 16-that he said Kenny owed him.
Whether this was just a rather clumsy conversation-opener, or whether,
contrary to the accounts that Mike and Sylvia later gave police, this was
the only grudge that Mike had against Kenny, is unclear. In any event,
the encounter almost immediately became violent. Mike pulled a knife
from a sheath on his belt and stabbed Kenny in the midsection, injuring
him seriously. Mike and Sylvia quickly left the scene, but Kenny managed to make a 911 call and gave the operator enough identifying
information about them that they were promptly picked up by police.
Sylvia first told a police officer informally that she, Mike, and Kenny
had come to Kenny's apartment together, that Mike had gone to the
store to buy liquor, and that while he was gone, Kenny had sexually
assaulted her, pinning her to the ground and trying to remove her
clothes; the knife fight began when Mike came back to see Kenny on top
of Sylvia. She repeated this account at around 7 p.m. in a more formal
interview at the police station. This interview was audiotaped, and Sylvia
was given the Miranda warnings and asked a series of identifying
questions before the interview began. Soon after, Mike-whom the police
16

One of the interviews with Mike contains this passage:

Q ... [H]e apparently owed you some money for perhaps some marijuana or drugs

A I (won't?) (inaudible) specify.
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had separated from Sylvia-was subjected to a similar interview, and he
gave an account that was similar in many respects but not in all:
According to Mike, Sylvia had mentioned a prior sexual assault committed by Kenny while Sylvia was living apart from Mike, and so the
incident on the evening of August 5 was the second of its type.
Suspicious because of the inconsistencies, and also perhaps dubious
that Mike would leave his wife alone with a man who had allegedly
assaulted her, the police pressed Sylvia and Mike further. They each
agreed to give another statement, again audiotaped and under considerable formality. Now their stories were more congruent with each other,
and put them in a far more aggressive light: The sexual assault had
occurred several weeks earlier, during the period of estrangement, and
Mike had been nowhere near the scene. But mention of it during the
afternoon's bout of drinking had prompted Mike to say that Kenny
"deserve[d] a ass-whoopin'." And so they set off to find Kenny. He came
to the door of his apartment, and there the fight occurred. On one
crucial issue, however, Mike and Sylvia's accounts were subtly different.
Mike indicated that before the stabbing he thought Kenny had reached
inside his pocket for something, though he admitted he could not be
sure. Sylvia seemed not to believe that Kenny had reached for anything
before Mike stabbed him. But Syliva acknowledged some difficulty in
giving a detailed rendition of the incident: "I shut my eyes and I didn't
really watch. I was like in shock ... "

* **
In preparing for Mike's trial, before Judge Richard Strophy of
Thurston County Superior Court, the prosecution subpoenaed Sylvia.
But Sylvia did not want to testify at trial. She could have invoked her
Fifth Amendment right not to do so, because the state was considering
filing charges against her (and eventually did). She never did formally
invoke that right. But after the jury was selected, on October 18, 1999,
Mike's trial lawyer, Hugh McGavick, reported to the court that she was
invoking the spousal privilege. Washington law provides that one spouse
may not testify against another in a criminal case unless the defendant
spouse consents, so a more accurate statement-putting aside the unexercised Fifth Amendment-would have been that Mike was declining to
waive his right to prevent Sylvia from testifying. Nobody made an issue
of the difference at the trial level, and the parties agreed that Sylvia was
unavailable to be a witness at trial. McGavick contended that introducing Sylvia's statements against Mike would violate the spousal privilege
and-relying heavily on Lilly, which had been decided four months
earlier-the Confrontation Clause. After reading Lilly and the statements overnight, the judge ruled the statements admissible. He spent
little time explaining his view that the privilege did not apply to out-ofcourt statements made to third parties. But then at greater length, he
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ruled that Sylvia's statements were sufficiently reliable to be admitted.
In part, he relied on the similarities of her statements to Mike's own.
Were he to make the assessment without taking Mike's statements into
account, he indicated, the case would be a much closer call, and he
suggested that to avoid creating an issue for appeal the prosecution
should consider not using Sylvia's statements in its case-in-chief.
The prosecution did not heed this advice. It introduced Sylvia's
statement at trial. The jury found Michael guilty, and he was sentenced
to fourteen years in prison.
Through a new attorney, Thomas E. Doyle, Crawford took the case
to the Washington Court of Appeals. Steve Sherman of the Thurston
County Prosecutor's Office-who eventually would argue the case in the
United States Supreme Court-argued for the state. He contended that
Mike had waived his confrontation right by not allowing Sylvia to testify.
The court rejected the contention-Mike had a statutory right to prevent
Sylvia from testifying against him at trial, and he should not have to
choose between that right and the right not to be convicted in violation
of the Confrontation Clause. On the merits, the court held that the
admissibility of Sylvia's first statement rested on whether the second
statement was admissible, because the first was admitted not for its
truth but to show evasive conduct by the couple. As for the second
statement, two members of the three-judge panel held that parts were
too unreliable to satisfy either the Confrontation Clause or Washington's
hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. In reaching this
conclusion, the court attempted to apply a nine-factor test for reliability
that the Washington Supreme Court had developed. Concluding also that
the error was not harmless, the court reversed Mike's conviction on July
30, 2001. One judge dissented, concluding that the majority had erred,
according to another decision of the state supreme court, by assessing
credibility without taking into account the fact that Sylvia's statement
"interlocked" with Mike's own.
Not surprisingly, the State sought review of the decision in the state
supreme court, and on March 5, 2002, that court decided to take the
case. On September 26, the nine-justice court issued its decision, unanimously reversing the court of appeals and reinstating Crawford's conviction. The state supreme court agreed with Crawford, and with the court
of appeals, that he had not waived the confrontation right. On the
merits, though, the supreme court concluded that Sylvia's second statement was sufficiently reliable to overcome the confrontation right. In
this case, the court did not believe it needed to work through all nine
factors of its elaborate reliability test. Rather, it grounded its decision on
the facts that Sylvia's statement was self-inculpatory and that it overlapped, or interlocked, substantially with Mike's own statement.

***
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Enter Jeff Fisher. A young associate with a large Seattle firm, Jeff
did pro bona work for the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers. He sat on a committee that looked for potentially important
cases in which to write amicus briefs. Jeff spotted the Crawford case and
called Doyle, Crawford's lawyer, to offer the committee's help if Doyle
prepared a petition for certiorari. But he found that Doyle was uninterested in preparing a cert petition; it would be an enormous amount of
work offering a flimsy chance of success, and (given that Doyle had
already worked through the state's $2000 cap on fees for appointed
appellate counsel) no chance of financial gain. With the support and
resource of his firm behind him, Jeff offered to take the case over. Doyle
readily agreed. Jeff then wrote the petition that he sent me by e-mail in
March 2003.
When you write a cert petition, you always want to find a conflict
among the lower courts, for if there is none the Supreme Court is likely
to conclude that there is no need for it to intervene. And Jeff had a
pretty good conflict. The Supreme Court had held that in applying the
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" test under Roberts a
court could not rely on evidence corroborating the challenged statement
but instead had to limit itself to circumstances "that surround the
making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly
worthy of belief." 17 In holding that Sylvia's statement was reliable, the
state supreme court, like the trial court, relied heavily on the interlock
with Mike's own statement. That seemed to fly in the face of the nocorroboration rule, and several other courts had so held. It was reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the Supreme Court might want to take
the case to clean up application of Roberts.
But Jeff did not rest there. As I mentioned at the beginning of this
story, his petition included a second part that asked the Court to discard
the entire Roberts doctrine and replace it with a "testimonial" approach.
So we were not only rooting for the Court to grant certiorari but for it to
do so without limiting the grant to the first question presented, the
narrow and highly technical matter of how Roberts should be applied.
The state did not bother to file a response to the cert petition, but the
Court called for one. That was a good sign; it meant that at least
someone was paying attention, and as Jeff explained to me the Court
would not grant the petition without calling for a response. On June 9,
we got our answer. The Court granted the petition-a simple grant,
without limitation to one question or the other. We were in business:
The testimonial approach would now be presented to the Supreme Court
by a party.
11

Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990).
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As Jeff prepared his brief on the merits, he told me he was thinking
of flipping the issues, of arguing first the broad question of whether the
testimonial approach should replace Roberts and just addressing the
narrow, technical issue towards the end of the brief. I encouraged him to
do so. I thought it made sense, and that it would not diminish Jeffs
chance of achieving a reversal for his client. Of course, I was selfinterested: I was eager for the testimonial approach to be considered by
the Court, and I regarded the "interlock" issue as just one of many odd
questions that were bound to arise under the utterly unsatisfactory
Roberts framework. Jeff later told me that I was the only person who
advised him to switch the issues. Some of the wiser heads whom he
consulted thought that doing so-putting greatest weight on a request
that the Court should completely discard a long-established doctrine,
replacing it with a broad categorical rule, when there was a narrow and
straightforward way of ensuring reversal under the prevailing framework-was foolhardy. And this seemed especially so given that on so
many issues the swing vote was Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who had
an aversion to broad rules. In a brave move--especially for a young
rookie preparing his first Supreme Court case-.Jeff made the switch.
The first and longest part of his brief, which contained a powerful
showing of how lower courts had manipulated the Roberts standard,
asked for adoption of the testimonial approach, and only towards the end
of the brief did Jeff address the interlock issue.
Meanwhile, I prepared an amicus brief, arguing from the academic
perspective why the testimonial approach should be adopted. After
completing a draft, I asked law professors around the country if they
were interested in signing on, and eight of them did; David Moran of the
Wayne State faculty, a brilliant former student of mine, made particularly valuable contributions, and I designated him as "of counsel" on the
brief. As the argument date approached, Jeff asked me to be "second
chair" -that is, to sit next to him at counsel table during the argument.
I accepted with delight; on November 10, 2003, I would get to sit up
front and almost at the center as the merits of the testimonial approach
were discussed in the highest court of the land.

***
The Supreme Court justices do not file into the courtroom in a
single line. They emerge almost all at once from curtains behind their
chairs, and they take their seats immediately. Jeffs nerves were eased a
little by a reassuring smile from his old boss, Justice Stevens, but when
he rose to argue Crawford, he was hit promptly with pointed questions.
Notably, although Jeff mentioned the interlock question in passing at
the outset, the justices seemed uninterested in it; instead, they, as well
as Jeff, focused entirely on the testimonial approach. Justice Anthony
Kennedy posed a clever hypothetical that we had not anticipated. There
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is a serious auto accident, and insurance investigators take statements
from witnesses; if a criminal prosecution later emerges from the accident, are those statements testimonial? Jeff hesitated, saying that such a
statement was "likely not to be testimonial," but that if the statement
was made to a police officer that would "tip the balance." I wasn't happy
with the response. It seemed to me that even though the insurance
investigator is a private individual the statement should probably be
deemed testimonial because it was made in clear anticipation of use in
litigation. 18 Chief Justice Rehnquist jumped on Jeffs answer; if he was
balancing, how much certainty would be gained by adopting a testimonial approach? Justice O'Connor joined in. Wasn't the Roberts framework
working well enough? Why change? ("[W]hy buy a pig in a poke?" she
asked later in the argument.) Jeff argued effectively that actually Roberts was leading to very bad results in the lower courts.
Justice Breyer soon broke in to ask Jeff to clarify his standard of
"testimonial". Echoing the Government's brief in White, Jeff had spoken
of the "functional equivalent" of in-court testimony. But that, as Justice
Breyer pointed out, was a little vague. Did Jeff agree with the standard
articulated in the law professors' brief, whether "a reasonable person in
the position of declarant [would] anticipate that the statement would
likely be used for evidentiary purposes"? I held my breath. The "functional equivalent" was his starting point, said Jeff, but he thought the
"reasonable expectation" standard was "a good test." Trying to make
the testimonial approach appear unthreatening, though, he worked hard,
perhaps too hard, to emphasize its narrowness. In "99 cases out of
100 "a testimonial statement would be made to the authorities; there
might be "a rare, rare case" in which a statement made to a private
audience could be considered testimonial. Not so rare, I was thinkingbut that was a matter that could be cleared up in later cases.
Why should the decisive consideration be the anticipation of the
declarant, Justice Scalia wanted to know; what if the statement were
made to an undercover police officer? Jeff-not wanting to go further
than necessary in any direction for fear of impairing the formation of a
majority-suggested that this posed a difficult case. Uh-oh, I thought.
The Court is never going to accept the testimonial approach if doing so is
going to put in doubt the admissibility of conspirators' statements to
undercover officers or informants. Justice John Paul Stevens asked
whether it was the intent of the speaker or the intent of the person
taking the statement that mattered. Jeff noted correctly that this was a
question that the Court did not have to reach, but Justice Scalia
interjected: "I really object to saying, ... 'We'll worry about it later.' I
!8
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mean, if there are real problems that come up later, I'm not going to buy
your . . . retreat from Roberts."
Well, that sounded ominous-though I thought Scalia was just
playing law professor with Jeff. Jeff tried to suggest that a statement
should be testimonial if the speaker anticipated use in a criminal case
and that in some circumstances it would be testimonial if the recipient
did. But that did not relieve the problem. Justice Breyer pointed out that
under prevailing law an informant's testimony of a statement made by a
conspirator would be admissible, and that he would be "a little nervous"
about a test that seemed to throw that result into doubt. But there was
no need to do that. The law professors, he said, seemed to be thinking
that "this isn't difficult." Referring to the standard we suggested in our
brief, which referred to the anticipation of a reasonable person in the
position of the declarant, he said, "I think they wrote these words in this
brief thinking about [the case of a conspirator's statements to an
undercover police officer or informant]." As second chair, I was not
permitted to say a word audible to the bench. But while Justice Breyer
was speaking to Jeff I was well within his line of vision, and he may have
noticed that I was nodding my head, subtly perhaps but as vigorously as
I could within the bounds of decorum.
And to my relief Jeff soon agreed with Breyer that "the law
professors have it right." I am not sure that Justice Scalia's question, as
to why the proper perspective was that of the witness, had been
satisfactorily answered, but at least it was clear that Jeff was contending
that the witness's perspective was the proper one, and that conspirator
statements to undercover officers or informants were not testimonial.
And when Justice Breyer referred to "the new rule," it seemed to me
that he was treating it almost as a foregone conclusion that the Court
would adopt the testimonial approach.
The Court continued to pepper Jeff with questions as to the consequences of that approach. Jeff did a deft job of reassuring the Court that
adopting the approach would leave untouched most of the results of the
Court's own decisions. At one point, he seemed to say flatly that excited
utterances are not testimonial-a statement having no relation to the
case at hand that he would later regard as overly broad, a practicing
lawyer's counterpart to judicial dictum.
There was just one other set of questions that worried us: Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg pointed out that the reason that Sylvia was
unavailable for cross-examination at trial was that Mike refused to waive
his spousal privilege to prevent her from being a live witness. We had
been concerned that the Court might decline to reach the merits,
rejecting the view of the Washington courts that Mike could not be
forced to elect between his confrontation right and his spousal privilege.
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But this, it turned out, was not Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's point at
all. If Mike had a privilege to prevent Sylvia from testifying at trial, she
wondered, what sense did it make not to apply the privilege to the outof-court statement that was a substitute for her in-court testimony? It
was a good question, but it would have been better addressed to the
Washington Supreme Court, for it concerned only a matter of state law
and had nothing to do with the issue before the United States Supreme
Court.
Michael R. Dreeben, a Deputy Solicitor General and an extremely
skilled and experienced Supreme Court advocate, then spoke for fifteen
minutes. Amici generally do not make oral arguments in the Supreme
Court, but there is one big exception-the United States. When Michael
had asked for seven and one half minutes from each side, the parties had
little choice but to agree, because if they had resisted the Court surely
would have granted the time anyway. Michael argued that the reach of
the Confrontation Clause should be limited to testimonial statements,
but that within that ambit the Clause should not be absolute; if the
declarant was unavailable, the statement should be admitted if it was
sufficiently reliable. I had characterized this position as taking the bitter
without the sweet. To my relief, the Court seemed not to be buying it.
When Michael pointed to other areas in which the Sixth Amendment had
not been interpreted absolutely, Justice Scalia gave the right responsethose decisions, he said, were matters of the scope of the particular right,
not decisions in which the Court allowed other considerations to overcome exercise of the right within its proper scope. Michael mentioned in
passing that adopting the testimonial approach would require development of a jurisprudence of what "testimonial" means. Justice Scalia
asked: "Do you think that developing a jurisprudence to decide what
constitutes testimonial statements is any more difficult than developing
a jurisprudence to determine what are sufficient indicia of reliability to
overcome the text of the Confrontation Clause?" I liked that. Justice
Scalia seemed to be signaling that he would reject any theory that
allowed a confrontation claim to be overcome by a determination of
reliability. As Michael sat down, it seemed to me that he had made very
little headway.
Steve Sherman, arguing for the state, had an even more difficult
time. Justice Breyer joined Justice Scalia in expressing skepticism about
the constitutional validity of a reliability test. And even if Roberts
applied, the justices suggested, it did not appear Sylvia's statement
should have been admitted. Justice Ginsburg expressed puzzlement as to
how Sylvia's statement could be deemed reliable given that Sylvia said
she had her eyes closed part of the time-and suggested that the fact
that the Washington Supreme Court nevertheless deemed the statement
reliable reflected the arbitrariness of the reliability test. And the justices
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also doubted that her statement and Mike's should qualify as interlocking, given that they differed on the crucial point for which Sylvia's was
offered, or that Lee v. Illinois, a case involving confessions by two
suspects, left any space for the admission of Sylvia's statement on an
interlock theory. Steve conceded the difficulty, and said weakly that the
Washington Supreme Court had interpreted Lee to permit admission.
"Well, maybe they better re-read it," said Justice O'Connor, to laughter
in the courtroom. And at that moment I suspect that Steve Sherman
realized there was not much chance that Michael Crawford's conviction
would be upheld. Jeff treated his rebuttal time the way a quarterback
with a ten-point lead treats the last thirty seconds of play; he took no
chances, offering an historical overview of why a reliability test was
inappropriate.
As we reflected on the argument over lunch, we had reason for
confidence. Not a single justice seemed inclined to uphold the conviction,
but of course our interest went far beyond that. More significantly, none
of the justices seemed drawn to the Solicitor General's approach. The
questioning of Jeff, which had focused entirely on the testimonial approach, gave us reason to think that as many as seven justices might join
an opinion adopting that approach: Only two justices, Rehnquist and
O'Connor, had expressed doubts about the need for making a wholesale
change in doctrine; the others seemed primarily interested in exploring
the contours of the doctrine. And if some of Jeffs answers exploring
those contours were not the ones I would have given (easy to say from
the second chair!), that was a relatively small matter; it was clear
enough, Justice Scalia's jab notwithstanding, that if the Court were
going to adopt the testimonial approach in this case it could not resolve
all the difficult issues at once. Maybe, I said to Dave Moran over lunch,
even Rehnquist and O'Connor would go along with an opinion adopting
the testimonial approach. Dave's optimism didn't carry that far.

***
Now we just had to wait. On December 15, Jeff sent me a message
saying that the justices had heard nine cases in the November sitting, so
he expected each justice to write for the Court in one case-and the first
decision had just been handed down, with the Court's opinion by
Rehnquist! As the cases came down, eliminating the justices one by one
as potential authors of the Crawford opinion, we played a little game,
adjusting up or down our assessment of the odds that the Court would
adopt the testimonial approach. With a flurry of decisions issued on
February 24, there was only one case left from the sitting, Crawford, and
only one justice who had not written a majority opinion, Scalia. Maybe,
Jeff speculated, the decision was taking so long because O'Connor was
writing a long historical dissent.

***
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At last, on March 8, 2004, the decision came down. Sure enough, the
Court unanimously reversed Crawford's conviction, Justice Scalia wrote
the Court's opinion, six other justices joined in, and the Chief Justice,
joined only by Justice O'Connor (not the other way around), concurred
separately. Most importantly, the majority opinion, over the objection of
those two justices, explicitly adopted the testimonial approach.
After reviewing the historical background of the Confrontation
Clause, Justice Scalia concluded that "testimonial hearsay" was the
principal, if not the only, object of concern of the Clause. And, he wrote,
"the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable
to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for crossexamination." And in these two propositions was the essence of the
testimonial approach to the Clause. Although the actual results of
Supreme Court decisions were largely in accordance with these principles, Justice Scalia wrote, the rationale stated by the Court under
Roberts, based on an assessment of reliability, was unsound. A judicial
determination of reliability could not replace the constitutionally prescribed procedure, cross-examination-and as this case and many others
in the lower courts demonstrated, judicial assessments of reliability were
unpredictable and sometimes resulted in admitting statements that
should have been deemed to be at the center of the Confrontation
Clause's concerns. Without deciding what the fate of the Roberts standard should be with respect to statements not deemed to be testimonial,
the Court was utterly clear with respect to statements that are testimonial: They could not be admitted against an accused unless he has had a
chance to cross-examine the witness and the witness is unavailable to
testify at trial.
But what are testimonial statements? Here was an irony, and one
that Jeff particularly relished, given Justice Scalia's jab at him during
the oral argument: "We leave for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.' Whatever else the term covers,
it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing,
before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations."
And the statement here, "knowingly given in response to structured
police questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition" of interrogation. I thought the Court acted sensibly in taking this general approach-avoiding the articulation of a general standard in the first case
transforming the law of the confrontation right, but reciting some clear
instances of statements that are testimonial, and holding that the
statement at issue clearly fell into one of those categories. To what
extent the approach was a necessary compromise to achieve a majority
opinion and to what extent it was a product of simple caution I do not
know.
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There were other relatively narrow points that I was glad to see in
the opinion (even apart from the citation of one of my articles!). The
Court said that it was "questionable whether testimonial statements
would ever have been admissible on [the] ground [that they were
spontaneous] in 1791 [when the Sixth Amendment was adopted]; to the
extent the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations existed at all,
it required that the statements be made "'immediat[ely] upon the hurt
received, and before [the declarant] had time to devise or contrive any
thing for her own advantage.' Thompson v. Trevanion, Skin. 402, 90
Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B.1694).'' That struck me as exactly right-and language that should be heeded by courts that have allowed prosecutors to
prove their cases on the basis of accusations assertedly made under
excitement by complainants who for one reason or another do not testify
at trial. 19 The Court noted that, though there have always been exceptions to the rule against hearsay, the only exception that was established
in 1791 that would admit testimonial hearsay against a criminal defendant was the one for dying declarations. Exactly right again. "If this
exception must be accepted on historical grounds," the Court said, "it is
sui generis." I was glad to see the contingent nature of this statement;
the Court reserved the question whether the Confrontation Clause
"incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations,"and I
think the answer should be negative. Rather, I believe many dying
declarations should be admissible on the grounds that if the reason the
witness cannot testify at trial is that the accused murdered her, then the
accused has forfeited the right to demand that the statement be excluded
for want of confrontation. And the Court expressly preserved the concept
of forfeiture, not on a reliability rationale but "on essentially equitable
grounds."
There were also aspects of the opinion that I wish I could change.
Some stray language might be taken to suggest that a statement could
not be testimonial unless it was made to a governmental agent-a bad
result, and one that would open the door to the evasion of the confrontation right by the intercession of private organizations that would take
statements from witnesses and relieve them of the burden of testifying
subject to confrontation. And the Court's apparent emphasis on prosecutorial abuse raised the danger that statements would not be deemed
testimonial absent such abuse, which would be a most unfortunate
construction (and therefore ultimately one that I do not believe the
Court will adopt).
19 In fact, it now appears clear that the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations
did not exist in 1791; this is a point that Jeff and I are making in the pending cases of
Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, respectively. Also, though not of great
importance, with the help of my superb research assistant, Josh Diehl, I have determined
that Thompson was decided in 1693 not 1694.
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Important as these matters were, they were relatively trivial in
context, especially because they could be straightened out later. Overwhelming all other considerations was the fact that the Court had
transformed the Confrontation Clause by adopting the testimonial approach. 20

* **
In October, Justice Scalia spent two days at our law school. He
attended a lunchtime presentation I made to our faculty of a paper I had
written before Crawford but that was published after. My main argument was that evidentiary discourse relies too much on the notion that
the jury is unable to deal satisfactorily with some types of evidence. One
of my illustrations was the Confrontation Clause as it was applied before
Crawford. I noted that the change I advocated in the paper had "just
happened." Justice Scalia appeared amused, and I noted further that
with the author of the opinion that had achieved this great change in
attendance, the gracious thing to do would be to acknowledge his
contribution and move on. But being an academic, I could not resist the
opportunity to carp about one aspect of the opinion that I did not like,
the apparent emphasis on prosecutorial abuse. During the question
period, Justice Scalia pressed me on the point. Why should the question
of whether a statement is testimonial be determined from the perspective of the speaker rather than that of, say, a police officer who took the
statement? I was able to say that this was the second time I had heard
him ask that question, and the first time-when I was sitting in front of
his Court at the Crawford argument-I was not allowed to say a word.
Now I had my chance. I told Justice Scalia that making the role of
government agents decisive is wrong on several grounds. It is wrong
historically, for the confrontation right predated the existence of police
officers and prosecutors. It is wrong analytically, for a police officer or
prosecutor does nothing wrong in taking statements from witnesses in
the defendant's absence. Indeed, this is how much police work is accomplished. It is the court that violates an accused's right by admitting an
incriminating testimonial statement if the accused does not have an
opportunity to cross-examine the person who made it. And it leads to
very bad results: If a witness shoves an affidavit under the courthouse
door, with no involvement by the police or prosecutor, and says, "Here is
20

I will indulge here in a purely personal note. Shortly before the decision came down,
I spoke about the case with my father, who had just turned 95. His powers of understanding were limited but he was eager to know about it; he couldn't much focus on the
potential implications of the case for the administration of criminal justice, but his concern
for his son's career remained as strong as ever. When I talked to him about the decision
shortly after it was issued, the pride and delight in his voice were just what they would
have been in his prime. Seven weeks later, he died swiftly and peacefully. The time was not
too soon-but I was glad that it had not come two months sooner.
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my accusation, but I don't want to come to court to talk about it," the
affidavit is plainly testimonial, and it is just as plain that the statement
should be inadmissible.

***
As a result of the Supreme Court's reversal of his conviction,
Michael Crawford was able to negotiate a plea yielding a reduced
sentence of ten years. But of course that did not end the story of
Crawford; that story is just beginning. By transforming the jurisprudence of the Confrontation Clause, the case opened up an array of issues.
Although some of the most egregious violations of the confrontation
right that recurred before the decision-such as the use against defendants of statements made, without cross-examination, in grand jury
testimony or in plea hearings-have pretty much ended, many courts
have given the decision a grudging interpretation. Some courts have
treated Crawford's enumeration of core examples of testimonial statements as if it stated the outer bounds of that category. Some have
insisted that only formal statements could be considered testimonialthus admitting without cross-examination statements that were clearly
made with the anticipation that they would be used in prosecution, so
long as they were made informally. Some have said that only statements
made in response to official interrogation can be considered testimonial,
and have declined to characterize as interrogation any questioning that
was not "structured." 21
One recurrent issue involves accusatory statements made in 911
calls. Another, related, issue involves accusatory statements made at the
scene of the alleged crime to responding police officers. On October 31,
2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a 911 case, Davis v.
Washington, and a responding officer case, Hammon v. Indiana, with
Jeff Fisher and me, respectively, as counsel for the petitioners. We
argued the cases in tandem on March 20, 2006, contending that any
accusation of criminal conduct knowingly made to a police officer or
other government agent with significant law enforcement responsibilities
is necessarily testimonial within the meaning of Crawford. That proposition has strong intuitive appeal, and I am hopeful that the Court will
accept it. Whether or not the Court does so will, to a very considerable
extent, shape the future of the story of Crawford.
21 I have begun the Confrontation Blog, www.confrontationright.blogspot.com, to allow
me to comment rapidly on significant developments, good and bad.
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